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Abstract
Studies of the evolution of collective behavior consider the payoffs of individual versus social learning. We have previously
proposed that the relative magnitude of social versus individual learning could be compared against the transparency of
payoff, also known as the ‘‘transparency’’ of the decision, through a heuristic, two-dimensional map. Moving from west to
east, the estimated strength of social influence increases. As the decision maker proceeds from south to north, transparency
of choice increases, and it becomes easier to identify the best choice itself and/or the best social role model from whom to
learn (depending on position on east–west axis). Here we show how to parameterize the functions that underlie the map,
how to estimate these functions, and thus how to describe estimated paths through the map. We develop estimation
methods on artificial data sets and discuss real-world applications such as modeling changes in health decisions.
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decisions less transparent in terms of payoffs [19]. Traditional
decision theory typically assumes that agents are informed about
their behavioral options, or if not, then are at least knowledgeable
about the people from whom they might learn, preferably the most
skilful, informed, or prestigious members of the group [12,20–22].
In contrast, models of collective flocking or herding behavior
assume no such knowledge — agents are often represented by
vectors, with choice as the direction and transparency as the
magnitude. Even as most agents follow neighbors with no
particular preference, a collective direction (consensus) can
nonetheless favor of the minority, if there exists high transparency
of choice [23–25].
We see two major factors in decision making: social/individual
learning and transparency of choice [19], as depicted in Figure 1.
This heuristic map represents the relative magnitude of social
versus individual learning on the horizontal axis and the
transparency of a decision on the vertical axis. Following the call
for evolutionary theory as the integrating principle of behavioral
science [26], the map is intended to unify quantitative approaches
from multiple branches of social science, ranging from rationalactor approaches in the northwest, to more anthropological sociallearning theory in the northeast, to the ‘‘information overload’’ of
the southwest and southeast.
At the macro scale, the map reduces the complexity of social
decision process analysis to the coarse-grained simplicity of two
axes, analogous to a principal components analysis reduced to two
dominant factors. The north–south axis, which we parameterize as
bt , represents a measure of transparency in the payoff differences
among available alternatives, from opaque at the south (bt ~0) to
absolutely transparent in the north (bt ~?). Along the east–west

Introduction
In studies of decision-making and health, social influence is
becoming increasingly recognized. Coordinated behavior has
benefits for groups and the individuals within them. When
successful behaviors of the community are socially learned,
cooperation can evolve in social networks extending beyond the
limits of Hamiltonian inclusive fitness among kin [1–8]. Provided
that some fraction of agents learn individually [9], either as
‘‘specialists’’ or ‘‘generalists’’ [10], social learning can be seen as an
adaptive strategy among ‘‘scroungers’’ for the exploitation of the
information gains made by the ‘‘producers’’ who track the
environment through individual learning [11–13]. Most evolutionary approaches expect the most adaptive state to equilibrate to
a mix of individual and social learners whose proportions are
dictated by the degree of spatial and temporal autocorrelation of
the environment and the cost of individual learning [7,12,14–18].
This assumption of adaptive equilibrium is an ideal, however, and
not necessarily attainable in conditions of continual transition. As
social learners increase in frequency, they are increasingly copying
from each other, and so the quality of their information about
decision payoffs likely diminishes [12]. At the same time,
individual learners may be overwhelmed by rapid change, poor
information, or simply too much information in order to make
informed decisions.
For this reason, there is the important factor of how well
informed decision makers are — what we might call the
‘‘transparency’’ of payoffs in their decisions. A relevant question
about online social media, for example, is whether their
searchability makes decision makers more well informed, or
whether the deluge of social influence and similar options makes
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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the big-data era, as the covariate data could be comprehensive,
including vast records of previous choices. In all cases, the
characterization on social influence and transparency of choice
would provide a novel insight into the decision dynamics at the
population scale.
We previously described the map in terms of generalized data
patterns diagnostic of each of its four quadrants [19]. We focused
on population-scale data patterns and left specific empirical
estimation concerning individuals to future work. Here we show
how real-world data could be plotted as locations on the map in
Figure 1 and, if the data allow, as trajectories across the map
through time. This requires us to develop a method to estimate b
and J, either for each agent or for each agent’s group, from realworld data. We assume the available data include the (a) covariates
that may influence the agent’s choice, (b) variability of the agent’s
choices, and (c) strength of social influences upon the agent’s
choices. All three of these associations may change through time.

The Model
In parametarizing our two-dimensional map, we divide
transparency of choice into separable components for intrinsic
utility and social influence. Our model builds on previous work in
discrete choice theory by parameterizing the transparency of
choice as a function of observable covariates (see Methods). To
begin, let there be G groups with I players in each group. We can
think of I as being a large number so that the law of large numbers
gives a good approximation in what follows. For now, assume the
groups are disjoint, i.e., nonoverlapping. Agent i in group g
chooses choice k if the random utility agent i gets from choice k is
greater than the random utility available from any other choice,

Figure 1. Summary of the four-quadrant map for understanding different domains of human decision making, based on
whether a decision is made independently or socially and the
transparency of options and payoffs [19].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.g001

axis, the measured parameter Jt increases from west to east, from
a decision made individually at the western edge (Jt ~0) to pure
social decision making — copying, for example — at the eastern
edge (Jt ~?).
The framework has broad applicability, and one particular
application we envisage is toward fertility decisions for example,
using an exceptional long-term dataset on about 250,000 people,
collected in the Matlab region of Bangladesh since 1966 [27].
Those data are excellent, long-term monthly records of the
decisions that have been made over many years, along with
associated (anonymous) details of the individuals making those
decisions, such as total fertility, religion, surviving children, age at
marriage, household income, education and other observable
covariates that impact fertility. We can also consider social
variables as well, such as density of the behaviour within the local
social network. Other health-related examples would be smoking,
where national health services such as the NHS in the United
Kingdom or the ALSPAC dataset at University of Bristol hold
long-term data on anonymous individuals and their relevant
binary choices (to smoke or not, be vaccinated or not), along with a
wealth of covariate information on the individuals (wealth,
education, religion, and so on) but also often on social visibility
(e.g., kin members in the same dataset).
Work on peer effects in smoking behavior is vast, but we have
not found any work that attempts to estimate the dynamics of the
intensity of choice function, as we propose. Work that is most
closely related to ours [28,29] attempts to control for the effects of
self-selection into peer groups, correlated unobservables, and
contextual effects that tend to bias received estimates of peer
effects on smoking (e.g., estimates of our J parameter). This
valuable precedent, however, does not estimate the intensity of
selection function as we propose.
Our approach could be applied to far different scenarios than
health, including criminal records or consumer sales, where longterm choice data are available alongside individual covariates. We
see the framework as especially appropriate to online choices in
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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~ igtj ,
U

ð1Þ

at time t for all j=k. Here, symbols with a * denote random
variables (deterministic quantities will not have tildes).
Assume that
~ igtk ~Uigtk z ~Eigtk ,
U
bitg

ð2Þ

where the U’s are deterministic and the random variables ~Eigtk are
Independent and Identically Distributed Extreme Values (IIDEV)
across all dates, choices, groups, and individuals. Then the
transparency of choice is inversely proportional to how strongly
the noise in the payoff is amplified, 1=bigt . We then choose units so
the constant of proportionality is one (so that when noise is small,
transparency is high). As we will see, this noise can occur in
intrinsic utility and/or social utility of the choice. The probability,
Pritg (k), that agent i in group g chooses k is then the term for
choice k divided by the sum of terms across all choices, Z:

Pritg (k)~

1 bigt Uitgk
e
Zitg

and Zitg ~

Kt
X

ebigt Uitgj ,

ð3Þ

j~0

where i, k and g take the integer index values from 1 to I, Kt , and
G, respectively. The higher the transparency of choice is, the more
sensitive the probability is to the utility. Note that when
transparency of choice b is zero, utility has no effect on choice,
and agents are effectively just guessing among all the choices, i.e.,
1
Pr(k)~ when b~0.
k
2
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adequate time series data set on a vector of covariates, fxitg g, and
we have parameterized the transparency of choice function,
bitg ~b(h,zitg ). The parameter vectors h and Q2 can be normalized
to fit the functional specification, bitg ~b(h,zitg ), and social-utility
function, J(Q2 ,yitg ), respectively (discussed below).
The covariates for each agent include those that predict the
propensity of the behavior, denoted by fxigt g, those associated
with the presence of social influence fyitg g, and those that relate
how variable the choices were through time, fzitg g. These realities
are amplified by Q1 (individual) and Q2 (social), which govern the
sensitivity to inherent differences of the choice and social
influence, respectively. In other words, the parameter vectors
h, Q1 , and Q2 operate on aspects of the real world denoted by
positive scalars x, y, and z, respectively. Estimating the parameter
vector Q1 determines the individual sensitivity to differences in
choice (x1 {x0 ). Estimating the parameter vector h, along with
the scalar observable z, determines the transparency of choice, b.
Estimating the parameter vector Q2 specifies the social-influence
function, J(:).
We tested to see how these estimates can be used to describe a
path, fb(h,zitg ), J(Q2 ,yitg )g, through the map for each agent i in
each group g for which we have data at date t.

In order to incorporate the ‘‘east-west’’ axis of social influence,
one option is to add a term for frequency-dependent social
learning [30], whereas another is to add a social component by
which agent i makes pairwise expectations on choices of j others
[31]. Building on both, we define utility with respect to choice
k~0 and then divide Prigt (k) by Prigt (0), so that the partition
function, Zitg , cancels out from equation 3, such that
Prigt (k) ebigt Uitgk
~
:
Prigt (0) ebigt Uitg0

ð4Þ

If we then take the natural logarithm of both sides, we are left with
the transparency b multiplied by the difference in utility U. We
can then expand the utility function into an individual component
and a social component as follows:
ln

Prigt (k)
~ b(h,zigt ) ½Q1 (xikgt {xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Ptkg{Pt0g )  ð5Þ
ﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ} |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Prigt (0) |ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ} |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ
transparency

individual

social

for agent i, for choice k, in group g, at date t (recall that Ptkg is the
fraction of group g that chose k at date t).
Table 1 in the Methods section (below) summarizes the different
parameters and variables involved. Equation 5 separates, from left
to right on its right-hand side, an individual-choice component,
bQ1 , and a social component, bJ. The individual component of
choice is governed by Q1 and acts on the payoff difference between
options (x1 {x0 ). The social-influence component, governed by
JQ2 , acts on the popularity of the option (Ptkg {Pt0g ) that is
expressed as the relative popularity of choice k compared to the
choice of reference k~0. Although the transparency of choice
parameter, b, is part of both the individual term and the sociallearning term, our map depicts the transparency of choice and
social influence as orthogonal dimensions.
The model is intended to allow the estimation b and J from the
data and potentially map a trajectory through time for agent i in
group g. The transparency of choice, b, increases from south to
north on the map and the social influence, J, increases from west
to east (Figure 1). We may estimate bitg ~b(h,zitg ) once we have

Results
We generated artificial data to yield four different paths through
the map to test whether our suggested estimation procedure
actually works (see Methods). We can use equation 5 for a log odds
regression,




½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt )z
Prigt (1)
ln
,ð6Þ
~b(h,zigt )
Prigt (0)
J(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g{Pt0g )zEi1gt {Ei0gt
where Ptkg is the fraction of group g that chose k at date t. We
then specified the social-influence and transparency of choice
functions as follows,

Table 1. Parameters and variables of the model.

Parameter or variable

Description

U

Total utility payoff function (total)

i

Individual index, from 1 to I

k

Choice index, from 1 to K

g

Group index, from 1 to G

Ei

Random idiosyncrasies (noise) associated with agent i

bit

transparency of choice for agent i at time t. Depends on h and z.

J

Social influence for agent i at time t. Depends on Q2 and y.

Q1

Individual sensitivity to differences in choice (xi1gt {xi0gt )

Q2

Social choice transparency (parameter vector)

h

Covariates for choice transparency (parameter vector)

x

Scalar for individual choice

y

Scalar for presence of social influence

z

Scalar for variability of choices through time

Xi

Observable characteristics of agent i, consisting of fxitg g

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.t001
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J(Q2 ,yigt )~e

group) might be able to choose something different from the norm.
This event, however, becomes rarer as social influence increases.
We then used the modelling to explore how the parameters b
and J can be estimated from the simulated data. Figure 4 shows
how some estimates of the parameters, based on the data
generated via simulation, vary as we move along the axis on the
map displayed in Figure 1. We use a nonlinear least squares
(NLLS) method to estimate y2 and h; for y2 large (Figure 3,
bottom row), for example, estimating h accurately is nearly
impossible because there is little variation in behaviour as the
social dominance of the group dominates individual utilities.

Q2 yigt

b(h,zigt )~ehzigt :

ð7Þ

We can now use this parameterisation to explore how the
parameterised map applies to artificial datasets (see Methods on
how these data were generated). In Figure 2, we show simulations
of the binary choice (e.g., to have a child or not) with
Q2 ~1, Q1 ~1, and h~5 from equation 7, with group size
G~100 and M~100 agents per group. We then vary the initial
starting proportions of the 10,000 agents (over all groups) choosing
one (blue) versus the other (red). We can see that all simulations
converge to nearly 100% of agents choosing the blue option in
fewer than ten time steps, even if we start with a majority choosing
red at the starting point. This is what we expect when both Q2 is
positive and h is high and positive — the population selects the
option with the better payoff.
The specification in equation 7 allows other variations that yield
more novel results. To convey the effects of varying h and Q2 ,
Figure 3 shows the change in behavior for a binary choice under
different values of h and y2 (for clarity, Figure 3 shows just the
proportion of one of the two choices). In varying these two
parameters, we find variation not only in final outcomes after 30
time steps, but in the dynamics of choice as well (Figure 3). When
Q2 is negative, for example, we move toward social independence,
and, for positive Q2 , decisions tend to be made socially. Similarly,
when h is negative, we move south toward ambivalence, and, as h
increases, we move north toward a transparency between the
binary options. If y2 is low and h high, a member (or a whole

Discussion
In these tests, we found that estimation is reasonable for y2 but
less precise for h. We see the source of this ‘‘weak identification’’
problem in equation 5 where, because b multiplies w1 and J, there
can be difficulty in disentangling parameters in b from w1 and
parameters in J unless we have the right kind of specifications of b
and J as well as variation in the observables that go into estimating
their parameters. In equation 11 we can also see the challenge in
disentangling the size of b for the size of the variance of the
random variable on the right-hand side (multiplying numerator
and denominator by a scalar cancels out). This suggests that the
variance of the numerator has to be normalized to one, say, in
order to identify parameter theta in b.
We note that the inability to correctly estimate h for large values
of y2 is not important because the uncertainty around h when y2
is large shows that payoff/costs are irrelevant when social
influence is extremely high. In future work we will focus on how
to better estimate h. Moreover, as we focus on Q2 and h, we may

Figure 2. Simulations of T~20 time steps, with group size G~100 and M~100 agents per group. From equation 7, we set Q2 ~1, Q1 ~1,
and h~5. The noise component, Ei1gt {Ei0gt has mean 0 and s~0:01. Shown are proportions of the 10,000 total agents who have made one of the
two possible two choices, one shown as red and one shown as blue, through time. The different plots show simulations with varying starting points
for each proportion. The payoffs xi1gt and xi0gt are chosen from from time-varying normal distributions N(t=10,1), and yigt and zigt are both chosen
from time-varying normal distributions N(t=10,1). Gray bounds show 95% quantiles for sample paths over group and red/blue curves show the mean
paths for proportion over groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.g002
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Figure 3. Simulations of binary choice model with varying choice intensity h and social influence intensity Q2 . For clarity the plots only
show the proportion of agents making one of the two choices (e.g., non-parent). The panels show 16 different combinations of h and y2 , with Q1 ~1
for all. Each panel shows results of simulation with 30 time steps, 100 groups and 200 agents per group, noise component Ei1gt {Ei0gt with mean 0
and s~0:1, and starting proportion 80% for the choice shown (so the choice not shown starts at 20%). The payoffs xi1gt and xi0gt are chosen from
N(t=10,0:01), and yigt and zigt are both chosen from N(10t,1). Gray bounds show 95% quantiles for sample paths over group for the proportion of
non-parents over groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.g003

Figure 4. Map of the chosen values of h and y2 used in Figure 3. The red dots represent the true parameter values and are linked to their
corresponding nonlinear least squares estimates in blue.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.g004
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consider that Q1 is unnecessary. We prefer to keep Q1 embedded in
the model, as it allows for a priori assumptions regarding the
strength of individual vs social learning — from Q1 v0 (aversion to
choice 1) to Q1 ~0 (no individual bias) to Q1 w1 (bias towards
choice 1). Further, removing Q1 would change the inference on b
and J; that is, eazbx and aebx can be equivalent representations
when a and b are positive, but otherwise the relevance of a
depends on the magnitude of x in the former and allows negative
outputs in the latter.
The simple bi-axial map of behavior in Figure 1 aims to extract
from aggregated data the transparency of decisions (north–south)
and the extent to which a behavior is acquired socially versus
individually (east–west). We have proposed a means by which to
parameterize the functions that underlie the map and thus
estimate paths through it. Rather than assume how well agents
are informed in their learning, we can let transparency of choice
be a variable parameter in our models, with the aim of using the
models to infer transparency of choice from real data [19,23]. For
example, we might have a vector h such that the transparency of
choice would be parameterized as the specification b~h0 zzh1 .
A hypothetical real-world example for z might be the fraction of
unvaccinated in group g at time t. We would consider an idealized
binary choice of whether or not to get vaccinated at time t, where
k~1 would designate vaccinated and k~0 designate not
vaccinated. In this example, b grows linearly with zh1 , which
would imply that the more unvaccinated there were in the group,
the more transparent the decisions would become about vaccination. Other binary-choice examples might include whether or not
to use contraception, smoke, use hand sanitizer, or perhaps the
fertility decision of whether or not to have a child.
Social-influence studies that treat transparency of choice as a
variable suggest that it has a complex interaction with social
learning. Some of this interaction might be captured, for example,
by a specification such as J~Q20 zyQ21 , by which, assuming Q21 is
positive, the presence of social influence increases with the scalar y.
Hypothetical real-world examples for a group-specific y include
the fraction in the group that are high income or perhaps the Gini
coefficient of the group. Given the formulation for J, the scalar
factor y then affects the social influence associated with other
observables.
These parameters relate to debates on modelling fertility
decisions, for example, as explanations range from an intrinsic
individual utility decision [27] versus the social influence of the
frequency of a particular fertility level in their local community
[32]. For example, it may be that poor, uneducated women living
in a wealthy, educated group tend to adopt the low-fertility level of
the group rather than the higher fertility that would otherwise be
associated with their low income and low education as individuals
[32]. In this case the social-choice transparency, Q21 , might reflect
the tendency to have the same number of children as other
mothers, whose success and/or education has become more
socially visible.
Fertility research also generates the sort of long-term, timestratified demographic datasets that are appropriate to our
proposed estimation method for the map. More generally, the
growth of so-called ‘‘big data’’ on collective decisions also seems
suited to this map [19], which links different scales of analysis, such
as the microprocesses that produce observed scaling relationships
in social-network formation [33].
As new digital technologies filter and search social influences
and information, transparency of choice may be increased, but
conversely if agents are overwhelmed the online deluge of
information, options, and social influences [34,35], then transparency of choice, bt , may decrease (by decreasing h and/or zigt ). This
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

may be central to herding effects in online product ratings [36], for
example. Also, the transparency of payoffs may well be changing
for many health decisions - the rapidly changing conditions of the
modern world may effectively lower b as the connection between
the decision and its actual future payoffs are obscured by the
‘‘noise’’ of socio-economic change. Seemingly straightforward
social interventions may therefore have unanticipated consequences [37].
The dimensions of the map are also relevant to studies that
compare technological complexity with population size [38–41],
which assumes relatively transparent individual and social
learning. Adding agents who are uninformed (payoffs not
transparent) tends to cause a group consensus to regress to a
single mode [24,42]. When it is much easier, and less costly
(essentially free), to see what others do, then the balance could shift
to the east and south. When survey respondents, for example, can
see the aggregated guesses from other people, they simply change
from their original, individual guesses in linear proportion to the
distance from the group mean [43].

Conclusion
Having presented a two dimensional map (Figure 1) as a
schematic abstraction of human decision-making [19], we have
now gone further toward making this into an empirical tool to
project population-scale decision data onto axes of social influence
and transparency of choice. As the decision maker proceeds from
south to north, the precision of understanding which choice is best
increases. As the decision maker moves from west to east, the
strength increases of social influence or peer group influence on
which choice is best. Starting with a basis in discrete-choice
modeling with social influence, we have discussed how a path
through the map for a group of decision makers can be estimated
from data sets. Through experiments with artificial data sets, we
showed how the suggested estimation methods work and how
parametric specifications can be estimated. For smaller datasets,
we recommend maximum likelihood as the best way to estimate a
path through the map, and then for larger datasets it becomes
possible to use NLLS as the estimation method.
The map can now be applied to real-world case studies,
especially those that feature large, time-stratified demographic
data sets on binary decisions, such as those regarding health
decisions. The parametrization we have presented allows us to
extract, from these sorts of datasets, locations on the map
representing degree of social learning and transparency of choice.
As we apply this method in the future, we may be surprised to find
that standard, universal assumptions regarding certain decisions
may be becoming less appropriate, as the nature of such decisions
changes through time or in different cultural contexts.

Methods
Artificial data generation
We generated data for T periods, G groups with M members
each as follows. We first generated a random noise component,
Ei1gt {Ei0gt , for each agent choice over the time span, which means
T|G|M logistic random variates with mean 0 and variance s2 .
We then simulated variability in payoffs and social influence for all
of these choices as well. In doing so, we generated three sets of
T|G|M normally distributed random numbers, each with time
varying means and variance, one set for the x’s, one set for the y’s
and one set for the z’s. In this case we allowed the means of x,y,
and z to increase over time, by choosing xi1gt and xi0gt from
normal distributions with mean t=10 and variance 0.1, and
6
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decisive for the higher value of bi (farther north on our map),
representing greater transparency of choice.
Our use of the Fermi/Boltzmann function as our equation (9) is
fairly standard in discrete-choice theory, but it is also seen in some
studies of evolutionary games in finite populations, in which a
‘‘temperature,’’ or ‘‘noise,’’ parameter is varied (e.g., taken to zero)
in order to characterize the equilibrium in terms of cooperators in
the population. The same function has been used, for example, to
model the probability of outcome between two randomly selected
individuals playing Prisoners Dilemma or related pairwise game
[44,45]. In that case, the parameter (analogous to temperature in
the Boltzmann function) is intensity of selection rather than our
transparency of choice, which operates on the payoff difference.
The difference in our approach from game-theoretic approaches is
twofold. First, rather than play pairwise games, agents choose
among available options and the model relates how well choice
popularity corresponds to covariates among the individuals of the
population. Second, our focus is on econometric identification of
parameters and estimation of parameters as well as on the ability
to retrieve the model parameters from noisy data. In particular, we
are interested in estimating the intensity of selection as a function
of observable covariates. This effort appears new to the literature
on estimation of social influences on choice, and it raises difficult
identification issues that we have addressed through simulation
methods. We developed this approach in order to show that our
method works before applying it to field data.
Although this established approach does not model social
influence directly, it has been used as a baseline to infer it from
appropriate datasets. Aral et al. [46], for example, applied this to
daily data on the social network links and the date when
individuals downloaded a certain mobile-service application
(app). Aral et al. [46] considered individuals of similar propensity,
pit , to have adopted the app by time t, which for agent i was
estimated using a logistic regression equivalent to:

choosing both yigt and zigt from normal distributions with mean
10t and variance 1. In generating these artificial data sets, we
found that our simulation outcomes were well determined after
T~20 time steps, during which the effect of varying group size
and members per group was minimal when both G and M are
greater than 100. We then specified the social-influence and
transparency of choice functions as indicated in equation 7.

Functional forms and estimation
In order to identify parameters of the model that describe
movements across the map, we need to separate transparency of
choice from social influence. To do this, we start with the north–
south axis of the map (the transparency of choice) and then add,
via the east–west axis, social influence on individual choices. We
can start with the north–south axis. In discrete-choice theory, we
assume we have a certain number of choices available and a
certain amount of utility that is divided up among those choices.
We then effectively toss the choices randomly into bins of a certain
utility and find how many choices we expect in each bin. To start,
consider a population of individuals making a binary choice ({1
or z1), each seeking to maximize payoff function U:
max

ki [f{1,1g

U½ki ,Xi ,Ei (ki ),

ð8Þ

in which ki represents the binary choice and Xi represents
covariates of agent i such as family, peer group, previous choices,
or education level. The parameter Ei represents idiosyncrasies,
which are treated as random, even if privately sensible to each
individual agent. Following [31], we will assume that the values of
Ei are what are known as Independent and Identically Distributed
Extreme Values (IIDEV).
For a given individual, a standard approach assumes the
probability to make a particular choice is equivalent to the
probability that the difference in idiosyncrasies, Ei,z {Ei,{ , is less
than some threshold z:
Pr (Eiz {Ei{ vz)~

1
,
1z exp ({bi z)

pit ~

ð10Þ

where bit functions as transparency of choice and Xit is a vector of
observable characteristics and behaviors for agent i at time t (we
have subsumed one of their other parameters into the idiosyncrasies term Eit ). Having collected data over a 4-month period, Aral
et al. [46] were able to distinguish homophily — the tendency of
similar individuals to associate with each other — from genuine
influence (roughly 50/50 in their final estimation).
Now, to build from this background to an explicit consideration
of social influence and transparency of choice, suppose that we
have G different subpopulations, each with I individuals. Within
each population g~1,2, . . . ,G individuals are considered potential
peers. Suppose we have observed covariates for all dates t and
each agent i in every group g, as well as the estimated propensity
to be vaccinated, denoted by fxigt g. Also suppose, based on
previous studies, we have another set of social-influence covariates,
fyigt g, on agent i and group g at date t, and yet another set of
covariates, fzitg g, that relate how variable the choices were
through time.
h,zigt ) for each agent i for
Our goal is to plot J(^
Q2 ,yigt ) and b(^
each date t for each group g on the map, by which we could
describe a temporal path for each agent i in each group g. We start
with the scalar covariate case where choice number 1 is made over
choice 0 at date t. This happens when the utility of choice #1
versus choice #0, comprising the individual and social-choice
components, exceeds the random variable given the choice
transparency, i.e.,

ð9Þ

where bi is transparency of choice for agent i. To illustrate,
Figure 5 shows, for two values of bi , how the probability that
option {1 (versus option z1) is chosen depends on this payoff
difference Ei,z {Ei,{ . The probability transition is more abrupt or

Figure 5. From equation 9, showing how the probability that
option {1 (versus option z1) is chosen depends on this payoff
difference Ei,z {EEi,{ , two values of bi .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0111022.g005
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~ i0gt ~Q1 (xi1gt {xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g {Pt0g )w
~ i1gt {U
U
1
(~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 ),
b(h,zigt )

J(Q2 ,yigt )~ minf0,Q20 zQ21 yigt g
~J(
Q2 ,yigt )~ minf0,
Q20 z
Q21 yigt g
 20 ƒ0, Q21 ƒ0, Q
21 ƒ0,
[Q20 ƒ0, Q

ð11Þ

i.e., social influence is zero for all values of the parameters that
cannot be specified by the data alone. This level of identification
can be enough when we simply want to determine the strength of
social influence over time for different individuals and groups in
different choice settings. We discuss another specification of the
social-influence function J(Q2 ,yigt ) in Section 5, where we test the
estimation procedure on artificial data.

where, again, the covariates, fx,y,zg, are all positive, onedimensional scalars. Note that Q2 and h can be either positive or
negative. Table 1 (below) summarizes the different parameters and
variables involved. The parameter vector, (Q1 , Q2 ; h), represents
the intrinsic and social sensitivities, given the transparency of
payoffs. The estimates of these from the data set are denoted
^ 2 ; ^h)— we use ‘‘hats’’ to denote estimates.
(^
Q1 , Q
With sufficient data on x,y, and z from a particular case study,
we can estimate the parameter vector, (Q1 , Q2 ; h), of the structural
model in equations 3 and 5 using the observed fractions fPtg1 g of
vaccinated individuals in group g at date t (recall that the estimates
^2 ). The model predicts that agent i in group
^1 , Q
are denoted by ^h, Q
~ is
g gets vaccinated at date t if the difference in noisy payoff U
greater than zero. In other words, the probability of positive payoff
~ i1gt {U
~ i0gt w0g, is equivalent to the probfor vaccination, PrfU
ability favoring the intrinsic plus social payoffs of parenting over
the random idiosyncrasies of choice:

Estimation methods
In order to consider two popular estimation methods, Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Non-Linear Least Squares (NLLS), we
consider a binary decision via equation 12, with the probability
statement
~ i0gt w0g
~ i1gt {U
PrfU
8
9
>
>
< (Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt )z
=
~ Pr
~Eitg0 {~Eitg1
>
>
: J(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g {Pt0g )w
;
b(h,zigt )

~ i0gt w0g
~ i1gt {U
PrfU


~Eitg0 {~Eitg1
ð12Þ
~ Pr Q1 (xi1gt{xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g{Pt0g )w
b(h,zigt )


~F ½Q1 (xi1gt {xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g {Pt0g )b(h,zigt ) :

~F

½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g {Pt0g )

ð16Þ
!

b(h,zigt )

Functional forms for b,J
To specify b(h,zigt ) we might start with the simple specification
b(h,zigt )~ exp (hzigt ), with zigt representing the variability of
choices through time t. With this specification, the larger b(h,zigt )
is, the less variable the choices of agent i are through time.
We can then discuss several different specifications of the socialinfluence function J(Q2 ,yigt ). To work within the borders of the
map we might, for example, specify the social-influence function as

L(Q1 ,Q2 ,hDdata)~

ð13Þ

S
P
F (Xigt ) f(i[g),g,tg
f(i[g),g,tg |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
successes
1{S

f(i[g),g,tg ,
1{F (Xigt )
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}

where F(:) is the cumulative distribution function of the random
variable, ~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 , and
Xigt :½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt{xi0gt )zJ(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g{Pt0g )b(h,zigt ): ð18Þ
In the standard versions of estimation of discrete-choice models,
the transparency of choice, b(h,zigt ), is typically assumed to be
constant (absorbed into the other parameters by a normalization
convention). We are interested in how b varies, however, so we
must modify the conventional textbook approach [47]. One
popular way of proceeding is to formulate dynamic discrete-choice
models [48], which often use Markov chain formulations or
hazard-function formulations. However, for simplicity we wish to

ð14Þ

Further, we see that if the data have a wide enough range over
individuals, groups, and dates, of values of yigt , it must be the case
that
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

ð17Þ

failures

This function allows J(Q2 ,yigt ) to take the value zero with
positive probability, and we require the function J(Q2 ,yigt )§0, i.e.,
to not allow J(Q2 ,yigt )v0, so that the farthest west part of the map
corresponds to J(Q2 ,yigt )~0. In the absence of social influence,
the value of yigt ~0. If we assume that J(Q2 ,y)~J(
Q2 ,y) for an
open set of y’s implies Q2 ~
Q2 , and that b(h,z)~b(h,z) for an open
set of z’s implies h~h, then the absence of social influence yigt ~0
implies
20 ƒ0:
Q20 ƒ0 and Q

,

where F(:) is the cumulative distribution function of the random
variable, ~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 . We have added a constant term, Q10 , and a
slope term, Q11 , in equation 16 to capture variation among agents
in how they respond to different alternatives, independent of social
influences.
Now, denote by Sigt Ef1,0g the random variable, which is either
1 if agent i in group g succeeds (or chooses ‘‘yes’’) at date t or 0 if
agent i in group g fails (or chooses ‘‘no’’) at date t. From equation
16 we can write the likelihood function for the probability of
Q1 , Q2 , and h, given the real-world data ([47], section 17.3), which
relates to how well the model predicts all the observed successes
(yeses) and failures (nos):

Here, F (x): Prf~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 ƒxg is the cumulative distribution
function of the random variable, ~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 .

J(Q2 ,yigt )~ minf0,Q20 zQ21 yigt g:

ð15Þ
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of large sample size and data overflow, an improved NLLS
estimation process might use a growing window in time, i.e., start
with points corresponding to time 0ƒtƒ5 and locate a plausible
region on the parameter space, add more points for time 0ƒtƒ10
and update, and so on.
Consider the functional-form specifications for the transparency
of choice function and the social-influence function,

remain as close as possible to the static framework with
independent stochastic drivers. Therefore, we shall work with
the likelihood function (equation 3.7) above, where the ultimate
stochastic drivers are IIDEV across individuals, groups, and dates.
In the scalar case, formulas for the partial derivatives of the
likelihood function with respect to Q10 ,Q11 ,Q2 ,h are straightforward. The maximum-likelihood estimator, at the peak of the
likelihood function, is found by setting these four partial
derivatives of the likelihood function equal to zero. This yields
four nonlinear equations in four unknowns. When one takes these
four partial derivatives and sets the four resulting equations equal
to zero, one will see that when, for some reason, the socialinfluence function is always zero, then the pair Q10 ,Q11 is
determined only up to scale. The nonlinearity of the social
influence helps resolve this particular identification problem.
If the social-influence function is zero, however, or restricted to
be zero, we normalize the four equations by dividing the equations
by Q10 =0, which can be further simplified by setting Q10 ~1 and
solving the remaining three equations for Q11 ,Q2 , and h. Three
nonlinear equations in three unknowns is still more challenging
than simple Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis.
Packages such as Matlab or R are good for general ML
estimation, which works well when we have few observations per
cell and enough observations per cell to allow for logistic
regression [49]. Also, ML estimation does not assume that errors
follow a specific distribution, whereas NLLS assumes normality of
the errors, and one can use least squares estimators as starting
points on the ML solver. ML estimation is less demanding of data
sets than NLLS [47, chapter 14], but in cases where there is a large
amount of data, we can also consider NLLS estimation methods
that require larger data sets. Equation 5 suggests the NLLS
regression equation of the log odds of agent i in group g of
choosing choice 1 rather than choice zero at date t,
ln

Prigt (1)
~b(h,zigt )f½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt )z
Prigt (0)

b(h,zigt )~ehzigt
J(Q2 ,yigt )~eQ2 yigt :

ð22Þ

Substituting 22 into 19, NLLS proceeds by selecting the
parameter vector, Q10 ,Q11 ,Q2 ,h, to minimize the sum of squared
errors (SSE),
8 
92

< ln Prigt (1) {ehzigt ½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt ) >
=
X>
Prigt (0)
SSE!
>
>
; ð23Þ
iEg,g,t:
zeQ2 yigt (Pt1g {Pt0g )
X
~
g2igt ,
iEg,g,t

where

gigt : ln



Prigt (1)
{ehzigt ½Q10 zQ11 (xi1gt {xi0gt )
Prigt (0)
zeQ2 yigt (P

ð24Þ

t1g {Pt0g )

is the prediction error of the model. In other words, NLLS
chooses the parameter vector to minimize the sum of prediction
errors. Taking the four partial derivatives of SSE with respect to
Q10 ,Q11 ,Q2 ,h, and setting all four of them equal to zero, we have
the four following four nonlinear equations in four unknowns:

ð19Þ

J(Q2 ,yigt )(Pt1g {Pt0g )zEi1gt {Ei0gt g,
X
LSSE
~
gigt ({ehzigt )~0
LQ10
iEg,g,t

in which the right-hand side again consists of transparency of
choice multiplied by individual, social, and noise components (note
that the noise terms E in equation 19 are part of the standard
regression equation framework and are not the same as the
~Eitg0 {~Eitg1 terms in the logit equations above). Here, we assume
the standard regression orthogonality condition on the regression
errors,
EfEi1gt {Ei0gt D(xi1gt {xi0gt ),yigt ,zigt g~0,

X
LSSE
~
gigt ({ehzigt xigt )~0
LQ11
iEg,g,t
X
LSSE
~
gigt f({yigt eQ2 yigt (Pt1g {Pt0g )ehzigt xigt )g~0
LQ12
iEg,g,t

ð25Þ

X
LSSE
~
gigt f({zigt ½Q10zQ11 xigtzeQ2 yigt (Pt1g{Pt0g )ehzigt )g~0
Lh
iEg,g,t

ð20Þ

so that parameter estimates are consistently estimated as sample
size tends to infinity.
Note that equation 20 implies
Efb(h,zigt )(Eikgt {Ei0gt )g~0

We can see that if for some reason the term P1gt {P0gt is always
zero, then the pair of parameters, Q10 ,Q11 , of the direct utility
difference is determined only up to scale. To put it another way: if
we set the social-influence function J(Q2 ,yigt ) equal to zero, then
the parameter pair, Q10 ,Q11 , is not identified, i.e. any parameter
pair lQ10 ,lQ11 will solve the last equation of 25 with the third
equation dropped for all values of l. We resolve this problem if it
occurs by ‘‘normalizing’’ by setting Q10 ~1 and dropping the first
equation of 25. We recommend the same procedure for the ML
estimation above.

ð21Þ

by taking iterated expectations. Equation 21 assures us that if we
estimate the parameters in equation 19 by NLLS, the estimates
will have good properties, provided that the parameter vector,
(Q1 ,Q2 ,h), in the structural model in equation 19 is identified ([47],
chapter 7). Of course, since the function induces heteroskedasticity
in the residuals, b(h,zigt )(Eikg1 {Ei0gt ), of the NLLS regression
equation 19, this heteroskedasticity can be exploited to produce
more efficient estimates ([47], chapter 7). To avoid some problems
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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